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Introduction  
Advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems are already being 
used to enhance our lives and to transform the way businesses 
operate. Businesses across a broad spectrum of industries are 
exploring the potential gains offered by AI systems. In fact, the use 
of AI systems is already widespread in areas such as transport, 
finance, defense, social security, education, policing, public safety, 
and healthcare.1 The recent explosion of machine learning 
technology is arguably a product of two things: “tremendous 
increases in computational power and enormous volumes of 
accumulated data.”2 Unsurprisingly, legal frameworks and 
industry-based governance regimes have failed to keep up with the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Emerging AI: 7 Industries Including Law, HR, Travel and Media 
Where AI IS Making An Impact, CBINSIGHTS (2017), https://www.cbinsights 
.com/research/artificial-intelligence-emerging-industries/ (describing advances 
that are making AI crucial to modern industry and how various industries are 
using or are looking to use it) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice).  
 2. KINGSLEY ET AL., SLAUGHTER AND MAY & ASI DATA SCIENCE, SUPERHUMAN 
RESOURCES: RESPONSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF AI IN BUSINESS 16 (2017), 
https://www.slaughterandmay.com /media/2536419/ai-white-paper-superhuman-
resources.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). The difference between the terms data and information are important, 
although often the terms are used almost interchangeably. See What is the 
Difference Between Data and Information, DQ GLOBAL (May 27, 2014), 
https://www.dqglobal.com/2014/05/27/what-is-the-difference-between-data-and-
information/ (contrasting and defining data and information) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Data is raw, 
unorganized facts that need to be processed. Id. In general, data can be something 
simple and seemingly random and useless until it is organized. See id. (describing 
raw data as a “series of 1s and zeros that human would not be able to read”). In 
contrast, when data is processed, organized, structured or presented in a given 
context so as to make it useful, it is called information. Id.  
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newest AI. The existing gaps have led to industry attempting to fill 
the void, but these attempts are in their infancy and often fail to 
fully consider the various stakeholders impacted by the ubiquitous 
gathering and corresponding use of data.3  
Consider the recent news splash concerning Google’s 
advertising program, which is once again under fire for its use of 
highly secretive gathering, storing, and using of highly sensitive 
data.4 According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) Google is gaining access to “highly sensitive information—
the credit and debit card purchase records of the majority of U.S. 
consumers—without revealing how they got the information or 
giving consumers meaningful ways to opt out.”5 And, as is often the 
argument against the use of black box algorithms, EPIC asserts 
the “search giant is relying on a secretive technical method to 
protect the data.”6 Of course, this is not the first—nor the last—
criticism of big businesses’ use of black box algorithms. This Article 
seeks to further debates previously asserted by the author by 
examining the issue in light of the recent surge in attention 
algorithms are drawing, primarily because their use has grown 
exponentially. 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Kevin Petrasic et al., Three Big Questions About AI in Financial 
Services, WHITE & CASE (July 18, 2017), https://www.whitecase.com/publications 
/insight/ai-financial-services (noting that the stakeholders include consumers, 
technology companies, third-party data providers, and regulators, among others) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 4. See, e.g., Hal Hodson, Revealed: Google AI has access to huge haul of NHS 
patient data, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/ 
article/2086454-revealed-google-ai-has-access-to-huge-haul-of-nhs-patient-data/ 
(discussing a document which revealed the previously unknown extent of private 
healthcare data acquired by DeepMind, Google’s artificial intelligence company) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 5. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Google’s New Program To Track 
Shoppers Sparks a Federal Privacy Complaint, WASHINGTON POST (July 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/07/30/googles-new-
program-to-track-shoppers-sparks-a-federal-privacycomplaint/?utm_term=.f69 
32f73766b (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 6. Id. 
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I. The Growth of Advanced Artificial Intelligence Systems 
Advanced AI systems are already being used to enhance our 
lives and to transform the way businesses operate. Businesses 
across a broad spectrum of industries are exploring the potential 
gains offered by AI systems. In fact, the use of AI systems is 
already widespread in areas such as transport, finance, defense, 
social security, education, policing, public safety, and healthcare.7 
Of course, AI is widely influencing our daily lives, as demonstrated 
by the widespread use by both Google and Facebook, to name but 
two.8 
In many ways, people have become accustomed to the first 
level of the technological revolution which “has seen organizations 
automate repetitive, high volume, sometimes complex but typically 
rule-based (if X then Y) processes.”9 Yet, the recent explosion of 
machine learning technology is arguably a product of two things: 
“tremendous increases in computational power and enormous 
volumes of accumulated data,”10 both of which are new 
occurrences. As a result, legal frameworks and industry-based 
governance regimes have failed to keep up with the newest AI. In 
fact, as will be explored in Section II, most legal frameworks are 
based in paper-based data gathering and/or basic automation and 
are thus frequently required to smash regulation of technology 
advancements into privacy and property based legal frameworks.11 
The existing gaps in legal regulation has led to industry 
attempting to fill the void, but these attempts are in their infancy 
and often fail to fully consider the various stakeholders impacted 
by the ubiquitous gathering and corresponding use of data.  
                                                                                                     
 7. Anand Rao et al., Top 10 AI Technology Trends for 2018, PWC NEXT IN 
TECH (Dec. 5, 2017), http://usblogs.pwc.com /emerging-technology/top-10-ai-tech-
trends-for-2018/ (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 8. See Cade Metz, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are Remaking 
Themselves Around AI, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/ 
google-facebook-microsoft-remaking-around-ai/ (noting in addition that Amazon, 
Microsoft, and IBM “are also building cloud computing services specifically 
designed for artificial intelligence work”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 9. KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. See infra II. The Existing Landscape  
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II. The Existing Landscape  
As will be explored in this Section, the existing landscape of 
information governance is haphazard, often limited by the sector, 
and designed without cohesiveness. Even more problematic are the 
limited legal contributions, often drawn from existing case law, 
and regulations that fail to fully consider the nuisances of 
ubiquitous information flows, which instead attempt to cram new 
issues into existing frameworks designed for paper and pencil, 
simple single-step, technology. This Section will orient the reader 
into the existing legal landscape and will demonstrate the 
limitations of the use of these approaches in the information 
centric world.  
A. A Brief Privacy Primer 
What we put out in the public eye we cannot expect to be 
private; but, “[o]ne who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has 
a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at 
which he will submit himself to the public gaze.”12 
Historically, this sentiment was captured repeatedly in case 
law, founded under constitutional protections from governmental 
intrusion,13 some of the original torts14 created to protect 
individuals from public gaze. Today, in the United States, there 
are a litany of protections afforded to specific types of 
information—often justified by the sensitivity of the information 
or the relationship that exists between the individual and the 
entity.15 Some States have begun to more robustly protect 
                                                                                                     
 12. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905). 
 13. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy 
Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIV., PLI 1–46 (2006) (explaining in detail the history of 
information privacy from the colonial era to now). 
 14. See generally id. (providing details and history on the tort of public 
disclosure of private facts, and the tort of false light, and the tort of breach of 
confidentiality which developed to protect disclosures of information in violation 
of trust within certain relationships). 
 15. See generally Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g (1974) (protecting the privacy of student educational records); see 
generally Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1980) (protecting journalist 
and newsrooms from search by government officials); see generally Cable 
Communications Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (1984) (regulating cable 
362 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 357 (2018) 
individuals’ information gathered for particular uses, such as 
retailer-based information.16 
In contrast to the U.S.-based sectoral approach, the vast 
majority of countries, including nearly every country in Europe, 
many in Latin America, and the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa, have 
adopted comprehensive data protection laws.17 Arguably, an 
overwhelming number of countries agree on a list of basic legal 
protections, often based on Fair Information Practice,18 the more 
comprehensive Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Principles,19 and the European Union Data 
                                                                                                     
communications by federal, state, and local authorities); see generally Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (1988) (prohibiting employers 
from using polygraph screening in most cases); see generally Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (1986) (extending government 
wiretap restrictions to include transmissions of electronic data); see generally 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991) (restricting telephone 
solicitations, automatic dialing systems, and prerecorded voice messages); see 
generally Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (1994) (limiting 
disclosure of states’ department of motor vehicles records). 
 16. See generally 2017 N.J. Laws 124. State laws governing the collection 
and use of personal information continue to proliferate. One of the latest state-
based Acts—New Jersey—was signed on July 21, 2017, and restricts a merchant’s 
ability to collect personal data of shoppers and share such data with third parties. 
Id. New Jersey’s Personal Information Privacy and Protection Act further limits 
the retailer’s ability to scan an identification card to a limited set of purposes—
such as verifying the consumer’s identity—and prohibits the retailer from sharing 
that data with a third party unless the retailer discloses its data-sharing practices 
to the consumer. See Cynthia Larose, Retailers: Review Those Checkout 
Practices—Again, MINTZ LEVIN (July 26, 2017), https://www.privacyandsecurity 
matters.com/tag/new-jersey-personal-information-privacy-and-protection-act/ 
(listing circumstances in which data can be collected and utilized) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Recent activity 
in California and Illinois law have followed New Jersey in enhancing privacy 
protections for individuals. See State Laws Relating to Internet Privacy, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/tele 
communications-and-information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-priv 
acy.aspx (providing state by state overview of internet privacy laws) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 17. See Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws: 120 Countries 
National Data Privacy Laws, Including Indonesia and Turkey, 145 PRIV. L. & BUS. 
INT’L REP. 10, 10, 13 (2017) (giving a detailed geographic distribution of countries 
engaged in data privacy law). 
 18. See generally Memorandum from Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, 
U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec. on Privacy Policy Guidance (Dec. 29, 2008), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 19. Privacy and Personal Data Protection, OECD (Jan. 2007), https://www. 
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Protection Directive.20 Many would agree, at a minimum, that the 
basic principles of data protection include: 
 
 For all data collected there should be a stated 
purpose; 
 Information collected from an individual cannot be 
disclosed to other organizations or individuals unless 
specifically authorized by law or by consent of the 
individual; 
 Records kept on an individual should be accurate and 
up to date; 
 There should be mechanisms for individuals to review 
data about themselves to ensure accuracy. This may 
include periodic reporting 
 Data should be deleted when it is no longer needed for 
the stated purpose; 
 Transmission of personal information to locations 
where “equivalent” personal data protection cannot 
be assured is prohibited, and; 
 Some data is too sensitive to be collected, unless there 
are extreme circumstances that justify such collection 
(e.g., sexual orientation, religion).21 
 
While these basic data protection laws are a valiant start to 
encouraging data stewardship, the laws fail to envision advanced 
AI and ubiquitous data gathering.22 In many ways, privacy has 
                                                                                                     
oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/37626097.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 20. Council Directive No. 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, art. 2(c), O.J. L 281/31 (1995). 
 21. Within this area may fall some of the currently labeled National Security 
exceptions to data collection. See generally USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56 (2001) (“Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept Terror”); 
see generally The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 222 (2002) 
(establishing the Department of Homeland Security); see generally Real ID Act of 
2005, H.R. 1268, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005) (improving security for drivers’ 
licenses and personal identification cards). 
 22. See Richard Kemp, Legal Aspect of Artificial Intelligence, 22 No. 1 
CYBERSPACE LAW. NL 2 (2017) (noting that “governments and policy makers 
around the world are just starting to grapple with what AI means for law and 
policy and the necessary technical and legal frameworks”); see also Sara 
Rosenbaum, Data Governance and Stewardship: Designing Data Stewardship 
Entities and Advancing Data Access, HEALTH SERVS. RES. (Oct. 2010), https:// 
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become the talisman of organized resistance to the encroachment 
of ubiquitous data gathering. It is a false idol as “private 
information” is a mischaracterization indicative of a much larger 
issue that looms on the horizon.  
This is because much of the information that exists about a 
person is information that he or she freely share—thus, it is not, 
nor should it be, considered private. As such, the newest of data 
amalgamations create a dilemma for policy makers and privacy 
advocates, because people share a whole lot of information, which, 
in small, segregated, units, amounts to nothing. When combined, 
this information can amount to extremely accurate profiles of who 
we are as shoppers, as voters, as people, as neighbors, and as 
community members.23  
This does not suggest that privacy is not important. It remains 
important in the traditional manner in which the concept has 
always existed, governments’ intrusion upon areas of our lives that 
were never intended to be within public scrutiny24 and areas of 
protections that should be afforded due to the sensitivity of the 
information,25 both of which should continue be considered within 
the privacy rubric. That begs the question of how should we 
regulate data that is not, nor was ever intended to be, private? 
General information, such as age and gender can be gathered from 
a photograph or my Facebook page. How should we regulate the 
use of this data, for example, in the creation of a digital profile? As 
is discussed later, industry-based data stewardship and 
                                                                                                     
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2965885/ (“Data stewardship is a 
concept with deep roots in the science and practice of data collection, sharing, and 
analysis. Reflecting the values of fair information practice, data stewardship 
denotes an approach to the management of data, particularly data that can 
identify individuals.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). The concept of a data steward is intended to convey a fiduciary 
(or trust) level of responsibility toward the data. Id.  
 23. See Louise Matsakis, This Is How Much Marketers Know About You 
Based On One Facebook Like, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://www.motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/434dpw/this-is-how-much-
marketers-know-about-you-based-on-one-facebook-like (describing how easy it is 
for advertisers to target ads based on social media habits) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 24. See Solove, supra note 13, at 1–4 (describing the history of privacy as an 
American priority, dating back to the Revolutionary War). 
 25. See id. at 1–46 (noting the extensive control that private enterprises have 
over information technology resources). 
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compliance standards of impact assessments mitigate the 
consequences of this type of use. The ubiquitous nature of the 
gathering, storing, sharing, selling, and otherwise compiling 
information in the digitally connected, always “on” world, will 
make the governance of information “flows”26 difficult to achieve. 
B. Property and Proprietary Rights 
Property as a defining legal structure for data is also 
troubling, as case law in this area further reinforces the belief that 
lawmakers simply do not understand new technology. 
Databases have historically been treated as property within 
the law, as it is the storage system owned by an entity, and not the 
individuals’ data that is contained within that storage system, that 
is entitled to legal protections. These original protections arise in 
intellectual property law, yet the protections have been retained—
even expanded—as databases become more prevalent.  
For example, prior to 1990, a directory of information was 
capable of receiving copyright protections under the Copyright Act 
of 1976.27 Although circuits were split on the standard to be applied 
to determine the scope of protections, both approaches lead to the 
conclusion that a large majority of databases (then known as 
compilations) were in fact copyrightable.28 This all changed in 1991 
                                                                                                     
 26. Information “flow” is a term of art used within a group of commentators 
to attempt to capture and explain the manner in which data and information 
moves through data systems. See MATT BISHOP, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER 
SECURITY 436 (2003) (discussing how information flow defines how data travels 
through a system). I have argued that narratives such as this are crafted to 
prevent a true understanding of information and to instead create an image of a 
river that people assume cannot be managed. In this author’s opinion, this 
particular narrative feeds into the “magical thinking” narrative based in “black 
box,” “clouds,” and “mathematically based algorithms.” The narrative, crafted by 
industry to (in this author’s opinion) feeds the magic narrative—to encourage 
people to believe the vast majority of individuals cannot understand this 
technology and cannot control the river. 
 27. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (N.D. Ill. 
1988), aff’d, 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 944 (holding that 
telephone book white pages meet the requirements for copyright protection).  
 28. Compare Feist Publ’gs, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 
352 (1991) (describing the sweat of the brow doctrine as granting copyright 
protection as “a reward for the hard work that went into compiling the work”), 
with Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minnesota, Inc., 770 F.2d 
128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that compilations must contain sufficient 
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when the U.S. Supreme Court determined in Feist Publications v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co.29 that the telephone directory was in 
fact un-copyrightable.30 In making this determination, the Court 
clarified that the sole basis for protection under U.S. copyright law 
is creative originality.31 
The Court notes that “the vast majority of compilations will 
pass” the originality test.32 The cases after Feist are informative of 
the Court’s position. In fact, the subsequent cases suggest that the 
“originality” requirement is very easy to establish. For example, in 
Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, 
Inc.33 the Second Circuit sustained the “copyrightability” of the 
yellow pages of a telephone directory, finding that the selection of 
entries in Key’s directory was original.34 In addition, the 
arrangement of the directory into categories was original when 
“viewed in the aggregate” because it “entailed the de minimis 
thought needed to withstand the originality requirement.”35  
While the scope of protection is very “thin,”36 the ability to 
copyright is no longer the primary issue. Instead, the focus turns 
to the scope of protections. In the vast majority of post-Feist 
instances, the appellate cases have found wholesale takings from 
copyrightable compilations to be non-infringing.37  
                                                                                                     
creativity in their selection, coordination or arrangement to render them “original 
works of authorship” entitled to copyright protection), and S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating 
that a compilation  may be copyrighted “even where it merely consists of selection 
or arrangement of ‘facts’ which individually would not be copyrightable”). 
 29. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340 (holding that compilations of facts that lack a 
modicum of creativity are not eligible for copyright protection). 
 30. Id. at 362–64. 
 31. See id. at 358 (explaining that facts are never original, and the only claim 
on originality can be on the way facts are presented). 
 32. Id. at 359. 
 33. Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a published telephone directory for the Chinese-
American community did not infringe the yellow page listings because of the lack 
of overlap between the directory and the yellow page business categories). 
 34. See id. at 513 (recognizing the choice of businesses based on the target 
audience as well as the author’s personal knowledge of the businesses). 
 35. Id. at 514. 
 36. Id.   
 37. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law and Sui Generis 
Protection of Databases in the U.S. and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 153 (1997) 
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In response to these legal protection limitations, businesses 
sought to alter the structure or content of their databases to 
incorporate greater creativity, thereby providing greater copyright 
protections. There is little getting around the inability to copyright 
facts. Thus, even in value-added databases, copyrights only 
protects information that is considered value-added.38 To 
illustrate, West Publication has long held a database of case law.39 
While the case itself is not copyrightable, the case synopsis and 
indexing system are protected.40  
Intellectual property rights also include protections for 
algorithms41 under patent law. In 1994, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit decided in In re Alappat42 that an invention 
that had a novel software algorithm combined with a trivial 
physical step was eligible for patent protection.43 While many may 
assume that this and subsequent cases opened the door for a large 
scale increase in the patenting of software, this has not generally 
been the case. A 2011 Berkman Center Research report found that 
“most software firms still do not patent, [and that] most software 
patents are obtained by a few large firms in the software industry 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the shift in how courts viewed compilations following Feist).   
 38. See Baila H. Celedonia, From Copyright to Copycat:  Open Season on 
Data. The Supreme Court’s Recent Decision on Directory Copyright Protection Will 
Affect Similar Works. Here’s How to Protect Your Valuable—and Vulnerable—
Property, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Aug. 16, 1991, at 34 (recommending that compilers 
“consider enriching their publications in terms of subjective analysis of these 
facts,” and attempt to incorporate “value-added subjective selection and 
arrangement” to make their products more likely to be protected under copyright). 
 39. See generally Who We Are, WEST ACAD., http://home.westacademic.com 
/legal-publisher (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 40. See Celedonia, supra note 38 (noting that a computer database arranges 
data through software). 
 41. See Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, http://www.tarleton 
gillespie.org/essays/Gillespie%20-%20The%20Relevance%20of%20Algorithms.pd 
f (last visited Apr. 15, 2018), (recognizing that algorithms are encoded procedures 
for solving a problem by transforming input data into a desired output) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 42. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
programmed computer is not patentable, but “a computer operating pursuant to 
software may represent patentable subject matter” and therefore a computer is 
an apparatus), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 43. See id. at 1542–44 (explaining the technicalities of the mathematical 
algorithm exception). 
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or in other industries . . . .”44 In many ways, this outcome is 
somewhat unsurprising as the Courts struggled greatly with the 
issues, ultimately curtailing the availability of business method 
patents in the 2014 Supreme Court decision of Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l.45 In fact, Jasper L. Tran notes, “[t]his Article estimates 
that—without accounting for selection bias—out of roughly 
240,000 current patents in force related to computer-implemented 
inventions as of 2015, about 199,000 of those would likely be 
invalid patents under Alice, leaving about 41,000 valid patents.”46 
Assuming the correctness of the estimate, the number is simply 
staggering. It is important to note, however, that patents remain 
valid until challenged and invalidated,47 so the vast majority of 
these patents will remain in force48 despite the potential for 
invalidation.  
Moreover, one must consider the two research publications in 
tandem, the vast majority of these patents have likely been 
obtained by a “few large firms,”49 and most will remain valid until 
invalidated through an expensive and time-consuming process 
that favors the large, financially robust, firm.50 And, of course, one 
can imagine that large firms are in the best position to attack 
smaller, new market participants, who hold patents that have 
most likely been incorrectly granted. Consequently, it may be 
assumed that the existing structure is skewed heavily toward 
those that hold a larger share of the overall market.  
                                                                                                     
 44. James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 241, 241 (2012). 
 45. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351 (2014) 
(concluding generic computer implementation did not translate into a 
patent-eligible invention). 
 46. Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS 
Bank, 97 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 532 (2015). 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid . . . . The 
burden of establishing the invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on 
the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 48. See Dennis Crouch, What to do All These Invalid Patents?, PATENTLYO 
(Aug. 28, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/08/these-invalid-patents.html 
(explaining the retroactivity of decisions determining that hundreds of thousands 
of issued patents lack eligible subject matter) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 49. Bessen, supra note 44, at 241. 
 50. See id. at 248 (recognizing the increased risks and costs for determining 
patent infringement). 
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Assuming that intellectual property law remains available—
in a limited manner—to protect information, the area of law has 
long focused on the entity that created the original information in 
a database or algorithm.51 While this approach may work in some 
areas, it is immediately obvious that individual information, 
shared publicly, should not be thought of as ‘owned.’ It is the 
creative or original compilation of data within the database that is 
protected, and the information inside the database that is used in 
the evidentiary process to demonstrate infringing activity.52 
Simply put, a business cannot own my information in its database, 
but the business is entitled to have protections that provide 
consequences to those that intrude upon their database and steal 
the information wholesale. However, one must wonder how long 
such protection will provide any comfort to the business. As more 
and more information is freely and openly shared, as processing 
power increases, and as technology is increasingly able to quickly 
and cheaply gather information from disparate locations and then 
compile it into a “new” database, it is hard to imagine 
database-based protections as a long-term solution. Like the phone 
book, databases are capable of minimal protections, but the 
information inside is “owned” by no one.53 
The inability to resolve the issue of ownership has contributed 
to the rise of the control-based regulatory regime. Control—that is 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 
1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 808 (1990) (finding a white pages telephone 
directory to be uncopyrightable and determining the sole basis for protection 
under U.S. copyright law is creative originality); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASES 21 (1997), https://www.copy 
right.gov/reports/db4.pdf (“In the wake of Feist, database producers were advised 
to increase the likelihood of copyright protection by incorporating a more 
subjective selection of facts or a more creative arrangement.”); see, e.g., Baila H. 
Celedonia, From Copyright to Copycat:  Open Season on Data?, 74 PUB. WKLY. 34 
(Aug. 16, 1991) (recommending that compilers “consider enriching their 
publications in terms of subjective analysis of the facts,” and attempt to 
incorporate “value-added subjective selection and arrangement” to make their 
products more likely to be protected under copyright laws).  
 52. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 
346 (1991) (describing originality as the “touchstone of copyright protection in 
directories and other fact-based works” and noting that “a compilation is 
copyrightable only to the extent that it features an original selection, 
coordination, or arrangement”). 
 53. Id. 
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“what entity had control over the data/information at the time”54 
is growing as a conceptualization of obligations relating to the 
data/information. Entities within control of data/information have 
obligations relating to the protection of the information and similar 
responsibilities, including limitations on sharing with third 
parties.55 While control is certainly useful to create obligations for 
the entity that has the data/information, the concept does not 
resolve the issue of ownership, which in a property-based regime 
certainly creates a more complete bundle of rights for all 
stakeholders.  
Imagine property and control in another area of law, an 
automobile, for example. An individual can lend his/her car and 
the borrowing individual driving controls the vehicle. The 
borrowing driver has the responsibilities of driving the car, but 
he/she is not the owner. Despite the owner not being in control of 
the car, he/she still holds responsibilities as a car owner, even to 
those individuals on the road when the individual you lent the car 
to is driving. In terms of data, imagine if you are the owner of data 
and you rent out the data to another, you would still have 
responsibility as it relates to the data, such as ensuring the entity 
you lent the data to was actually capable of using the data safely. 
Although this may be difficult to imagine, control is a lesser and 
limited type of property based right, and full property rights are 
not being recognized in relation to data/information. Thus, while 
control can be used in limited circumstances, it does not resolve 
the issue of ownership and the corresponding rights and 
obligations that should exist for all stakeholders. 
                                                                                                     
 54. See INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, DATA CONTROLLERS AND DATA PROCESSORS:  
WHAT THE DIFFERENCE IS AND WHAT THE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS ARE 6, 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1546/data-controllers-and-
data-processors-dp-guidance.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (“The data controller 
determines the purposes for which and the manner in which personal data is 
processed . . . . This means that the data controller exercises overall control over 
the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of a data processing activity.”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 55. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 5, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
(obligating data controllers to ensure that personal data is “processed in a manner 
that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, 
destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures”). 
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C. Consent and Data Compliance 
In general, consent is a term best left to contract historians as 
the importance of consent as a legal doctrine has long been lost in 
the digital world.56 In the United States, consent has been watered 
down to such a large extent that many scholars argue it is reduced 
to a mere check box in the privacy debate.57 
As I have previously argued elsewhere, even when individuals 
are required to “give their consent,” it is often part of a “must, rush, 
and trust” process. 58 That is, in the digital world, individuals must 
have the information, item, or webpage, they are in a rush to get 
what they want, and they trust the law to protect them.59 Any 
affirmative click that stands in the way of this “must, rush, and 
trust” instinct is merely a formality, and thus, no longer serves the 
primary function that consent previously stood to fulfill.60 
Moreover, numerous research scientists have argued that even in 
the face of multiple click boxes and forced reading screens, 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Anjanette H. Raymond, The Consumer as Sisyphus: Should We Be 
Happy with “Why Bother” Consent?, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. BUS. 1, 2 (2017) (offering 
context for the place of consent in consumer purchasing). 
 57. See id. at 18–19 (noting that customers are largely helpless against 
“endless reams” of boilerplate terms they have no opportunity to negotiate or 
influence, and suggesting use “smart contracts” as one way to remedy this 
problem). That is not to write that this issue has been ignored by policy makers 
abroad, however, as in August 2017, the United Kingdom Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport announced its intentions to update the existing law. 
See DEP’T FOR DIG., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, A NEW DATA PROTECTION BILL: OUR 
PLANNED REFORMS 2 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/635900/2017-08-07_DP_Bill_-_Statement_ 
of_Intent.pdf (“The Bill includes tougher rules on consent, rights to access, rights 
to move and rights to delete data. Enforcement will be enhanced, and the 
Information Commissioner given the right powers to ensure consumers are 
appropriately safeguarded.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 58. See Anjanette H. Raymond, Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla? Creating 
and Protecting an Informed Consumer in Cross-Border Online Dispute Resolution, 
19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 129, 146 (Spring 2014) (noting that consumers save time 
by making presumptions about the terms presented to them, and knowing that 
they have little real choice in the matter, often speedily agree to contracts of 
adhesion). 
 59. See id. (stating that all consumer behavior of this sort relies on trust that 
the terms and conditions are not particularly egregious). 
 60. See id. at 144 (explaining that a consumer will act passively if he or she 
feels powerless). 
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individuals still fail to read terms, often fail to reflect upon terms 
they do not understand, and rarely refuse to click consent.61 Thus, 
businesses are able to dictate vague, widely ambiguous, overly 
broad terminology that seeks to capture the individual’s consent to 
any and all use of data, regardless of impact or intent, for now and 
forever.62 
For example, in August 2017, Tesla, Inc. confirmed that the 
Tesla Model 3 has a driver-facing camera embedded into the 
rearview mirror of each vehicle.63 Although the company insists 
the camera has not yet been activated, the company states it “will 
only become active after future software updates.”64 Of course, this 
would be an example of technology that is either covered under the 
existing vague terms of service or would be part of a ‘accept new 
terms of service’ consent that frequently accompanies software 
updates. This practice is so prevalent that popular Comedy Central 
program “Southpark” has prominently featured and discussed the 
issue for many years now.65  
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. at 143 (describing research that supports a consumer’s increased 
propensity to provide consent when engaged in digital commerce). 
 62. See Dani Deahl, Roombas have been busy mapping our homes, and now 
that data could be shared, THE VERGE (July 24, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/ 
platform/amp/2017/7/24/16021610/irobot-roomba-homa-map-data-sale 
(considering the case of the iRobot manufacturer, which after years of mapping 
private homes, changed TOS so that it may sell the information gathered about 
those homes) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
 63.  See Fred Lambert, Tesla Model 3 is equipped with a driver-facing 
camera for Autopilot and Tesla Network, ELECTREK (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:17 PM), 
https://electrek.co/2017/08/01/tesla-model-3-driver-facing-camera-autopilot-tesla 
-network/ (speculating why this camera has been placed in Tesla automobiles and 
how it will be used) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Jason D. O’Grady, South Park parodies iTunes terms and conditions, 
ZD NET (Apr. 28, 2011, 21:07 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/south-park-
parodies-itunes-terms-and-conditions/ (accepting truth makes humor more 
accessible) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also David Kravets, TOS agreements require giving up first born—
and users gladly consent, ARS TECHNICA (July 12, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://arstech 
nica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/nobody-reads-tos-agreements-even-ones-that-dema 
nd-first-born-as-payment/ (describing a study demonstrating few people read 
terms of service agreements before offering consent) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
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As noted by the Information Commissioners Office in the 
United Kingdom:  
This [consent] is seen as incompatible with big data 
analytics due to its experimental nature and its 
propensity to find new uses for data, and also because it 
may not fit contexts where data is observed rather than 
directly provided by data subjects.66  
Of course, as technology designers take note of the legal limitations 
created by the simple binary model of consent, new processes may 
be developed that address concerns.67 For example, it may be 
possible to have a “process of graduated consent, in which people 
can give consent or not to different uses of their data throughout 
their relationship with a service provider, rather than having a 
simple binary choice at the start.”68 
In addition, even if graduated consent is used, the sheer 
volume of data gathering and storage is an ongoing issue for 
organizations.69 Data protection regulation in the European Union 
requires, for example, storing personal data securely,70 keeping 
personal data up to date,71 permitting data subjects to access their 
personal data,72 complying with requests from data subjects for 
                                                                                                     
 66. INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE 
LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION 30 (2017) [hereinafter ICO Big Data] 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-
and-data-protection.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 67. See Raymond, supra note 56, at 146 (suggesting the protection of 
consumers from clauses that allow the stronger party to use arbitration, where 
they have a heavy advantage).  
 68.  See O’Grady, supra note 65 (accepting truth makes humor more 
accessible).  
 69. See Andrew Cave, What Will We Do When The World’s Data Hits 163 
Zettabytes In 2025?, Forbes (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/andrewcave/2017/04/13/what-will-we-do-when-the-worlds-data-hits-163-
zettabytes-in-2025/#5bf09889349a (describing how a growing overabundance of 
data will require additional consideration by corporations) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 70. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (setting 
out the rights of every data subject to obtain from the controller information 
regarding how and if their personal data is being used).  
 71. See id. at 36–37 (placing limitations permissible processing of personal 
information under Article 6).  
 72. See id. at 39–40 (mandating transparency and availability of personal 
data under Article 12 as rights).  
374 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 357 (2018) 
their personal data to be deleted,73 and actively deleting personal 
data once it is no longer required for the purpose for which it was 
collected,74 to mention but a few ongoing data management issues. 
Organizations, therefore, must be active in their data management 
compliance as simple cyber security protections are no longer 
enough, nor is the creation of a simple single event data 
management policy.75  
Yet, the regulation fails to appreciate the impossibility of such 
a data protection regime on business and the uselessness of it in 
protecting individuals and their information. Requesting data as 
an individual presupposes that the requesting party knows where 
the information is, what entity to request the information from, 
and that the data has not already been used by another entity.76 
In general, and the vast number of circumstances, you will not be 
able to untangle data from the information infrastructure. And, to 
keep individuals abreast of their information, any change of the 
use of the information requires new consent.77 Non-stop email-
based notifications and consent will not increase knowledge, and 
will only lead to information overload, resulting in individuals not 
glancing at the information but just merely clicking consent, or in 
the alternative, incentivizing businesses to include vague, over-
encompassing, overly broad consent clauses which allow any and 
all information sharing.78 Neither reality is one that society should 
support. Consent is irrelevant in the majority of situations in the 
digital world. 
D. Transparency  
Statistical models that accurately predict an outcome or 
classify an object have traditionally been transparent in their 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. at 36–37 (outlining the “right to erasure” under Article 17). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 43. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Schumpeter, Too Much Information, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18895468 (discussing the issues posed by data 
overload and suggesting that both individuals and corporations must work to 
combat the issue) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
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reasoning, as scholars have been able to see their workings and 
interrogate their internal logic.79 For some AI algorithms, this is 
much more difficult and, in some instances, in the current 
environment, is impossible.80 
Of course, to date, the assumptions that support the 
operations have been rule based, in which computers are merely 
following instructions and any errors are attributed to the people.81 
Some AI will turn this process on its head, as the machine itself 
will find patterns and create rules.82 In this way, it may just be 
that the machine is at fault. Moreover, as previously argued, 
automated processes and hidden black box worlds based in math 
and number crunching can still carry “an aura of objectivity and 
infallibility.”83 Thus, even when some transparency is possible, 
individuals tend to ‘trust the numbers’ despite evidence to the 
contrary.84 
The inability to understand the inner workings of an 
algorithm should not be permitted to limit the ethical or legal 
decisions about the consequences of the actions taken by the 
algorithm. In this vein, the European Union is attempting to 
regulate the use of machine learning: for example, starting in 2018, 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Dave Weinberger, Our Machines Now Have Knowledge We’ll Never 
Understand, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2017, 8:22 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/our-
machines-now-have-knowledge-well-never-understand/ (describing the 
development of modern machine learning and the differences that machine 
created models have from ones that humans have created) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.; See also Mark Wilson, AI Is Inventing Languages Humans Can’t 
Understand. Should We Stop It?, CO.DESIGN (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.fastcodesign.com/90132632/ai-is-inventing-its-own-perfect-
languages-should-we-let-it? (discussing two Facebook artificial intelligences that 
created a shorthand code for communication before being reprogrammed) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 83. See Anjanette H. Raymond et al., Building a Better HAL 9000: 
Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, Kelley 
School of Business, Research Paper No. 17-23, 7–13 (2017), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921442 (discussing the black box and invisible 
bias surrounding algorithms, analytics, and machine learning) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 84. See id. at 11–13 (discussing the tendency to rely on machine learning 
even when the logic underlying the algorithms is problematic and not based on 
the scientific method). 
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EU citizens will be entitled to know how an EU institution arrived 
at a conclusion, even if machine learning and a black box were 
involved.85 As University of Oxford researcher Bryce Goodman 
explains, the new data protection law entitled the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is effectively a “right to an 
explanation” for decisions.86 In fact, the law does more: it bans 
decisions “based solely on automated processing, including 
profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the 
data subject or significantly affects him or her.”87  
Unfortunately, the Data Protection Regulation will likely be 
viewed as a regulatory failure and an extreme over-reach that may 
just result in clever work arounds or the stifling of innovation.88 
For example, the use of the term “solely” will allow for compliance 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union regulations on 
algorithmic decision-making and a “right to explanation”, ICML WORKSHOP ON 
HUM. INTERPRETABILITY MACHINE LEARNING 1 (Aug. 31, 2016), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1606. 08813.pdf (summarizing “the potential impact that the European 
Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation will have on the routine use of 
machine learning algorithms”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). The use of “algorithmic regulation” may emerge as an 
option to fill in the gaps presented by static laws that cannot keep up with new 
advances in technology, as explained: 
Algorithmic regulation refers to decision-making systems that regulate 
a domain of activity in order to manage risk or alter behavior through 
continual computational generation of knowledge by systematically 
collecting data (in real time on a continuous basis) emitted directly 
from numerous dynamic components pertaining to the regulated 
environment in order to identify and, if necessary, automatically refine 
(or prompt refinement of) the system’s operations to attain a pre-
specified goal. 
Karen Yeung, Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation, KING’S C. LONDON 
L. SCH., Research Paper No. 2017-27, at 1 (2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972505 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Please further note that this study maps the 
contours of several emerging debates surrounding algorithmic regulation, 
drawing upon insights from regulatory governance studies, legal critiques, 
surveillance studies and critical data studies to highlight various concerns about 
the legitimacy of algorithmic regulation. Id. 
 86. See generally Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 85, at 1 (summarizing 
the potential impact of the GDPR). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful information and the 
right to explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233, 233 (2017) (“The GDPR is an 
ambitious, complicated, contested law aimed at making Europe ‘fit for the digital 
age.’”). 
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so long as the decision was not based exclusively in advanced AI, 
for instance when a human is involved in even a rudimentary 
aspect of the process.89 Additionally, the right to an explanation 
should not be viewed as a right to transparency of process.90 In fact, 
it is a right to nothing more than a basic explanation of the decision 
process, such as the notifications that occur when you are rejected 
for credit.91 Both of these serve as examples of the need to 
understand the basic inner working of the process and to seek to 
achieve a particular goal within the process structure. Otherwise, 
there is a risk of creating a set of rules that are likely to be easily 
subverted, and therefore meaningless. 
Of course, if one conditions taking action on first achieving 
some kind of objective scientific understanding about what caused 
something to happen, there exists the risk of either obtaining a 
license not to take any action at all, or creating false narratives 
that seem to imply the existence of objective scientific 
understanding of something when none exists. 
Currently, the inner workings of an advanced AI is almost 
impossible to understand, and no amount of transparency will 
remedy this predicament.92 As a result, transparency should be 
abandoned, at least as the term is used within the context of 
process,93 as it creates a false belief that human beings will 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (“The 
data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”). 
 90. See Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 85, at 1 (discussing the meaning of 
a “right to explanation” in the GDPR). 
 91. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 13–15, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
(providing rights to “meaningful information” about the logic involved in 
automated decisions). 
 92. See Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-
heart-of-ai/ (explaining that it may be impossible to explain AI processes because 
the computers have programmed themselves, and even those who build the 
technology cannot fully explain their process) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 93. That is not to write that all transparency is useless, it is not.  Outcomes 
of processes should be transparent as they are what can be used to examine the 
effectiveness of the evidence-based problem solving that was deployed. See Nicole 
Laskowski, Data transparency is the lifeblood of new information economy, 
TECHTARGET (Feb. 2017), http://searchcio.techtarget.com/opinion/Data-transpare 
ncy-is-the-lifeblood-of-new-information-economy (explaining the importance of 
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understand and interpret the inner working of AI algorithms, and 
allows an impossible objective to serve as a roadblock to the 
creation of regulatory frameworks. Instead, transparency of 
outcomes, with the ability to audit outputs94 that are the product 
of the algorithm, should be part of the design process, a point that 
will be discussed in detail in Part D, Section 6 (below). 
III. The Regulatory Future 
The law and ethics surrounding new fields of innovation do not 
have to be handled in a substantially new manner, so long as policy 
makers do not succumb to the dazzle of the technology.95 In fact, 
“[s]tates and societies are already equipped to navigate human 
error and typically have a range of escalating options for 
responding to the types of risks which could be associated with new 
products or services that are not responsibly deployed.”96 
Consequently, some commentators argue that the best approach to 
regulation of new technology is to adopt a design model based upon 
the identified spectrum of risk.97 
A. The Basics 
In general, the following diagram sets out the areas of concern 
that, that must first be considered as the key divisions. These 
original delineations can then be expanded into more widespread 
                                                                                                     
data transparency) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 94. See Anjanette H. Raymond, A Meeting of The Minds: Online Dispute 
Resolution Regulations Should Be Opportunity Focused, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 
189, 210–13 (2016) (discussing the importance of transparency as it relates to 
online dispute resolution). 
 95. See Bernd Carsten Stahl et al., Ethics of Emerging Information and 
Communication Technologies: On the Implementation of Responsible Research 
and Innovation, 44 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 369, 381 (2016) (discussing ethical 
considerations and responsible practices associated with handling certain 
information, especially with the emergence of new technologies). 
 96. KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. 
 97. See RISK AND SOCIETY: THE INTERACTION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 17–32 (Marvin Waterstone ed., 1992) (discussing risk analysis as 
a tool for policy decisions).  
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discussion within each area. It is essential to understand that this 
diagram does not truly capture information movement, it is simply 
an illustration to initiate conversation. 
 
As the diagram captures, there are multiple points to consider 
in the overall governance structure. First, data, as discrete 
individual units, can be analyzed based on the data and only the 
data.98 The diagram does not fully illustrate the multiple sources, 
both public and private, from which data arises—nor does it 
capture the ebb and flow of data into and out of the system.99 Yet, 
in the most rudimentary sense, at some point, data exists and this 
data must be subjected to the same rigorous review that any data 
within social sciences is subjected.100 Issues such as (1) where did 
the data come from; (2) does it capture the community we seek to 
capture; (3) is it verifiable, accurate, and robust; and similar 
                                                                                                     
 98. See THOMAS J. SANTNER & DIANE E. DUFFY, THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
DISCRETE DATA 2 (Stephen Finberg et al. eds., 1989) (discussing the differences 
between discrete and continuous data). 
 99. See Bernard Marr, Big Data: 33 Brilliant And Free Data Sources Anyone 
Can Use, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2016, 2:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernard 
marr/2016/02/12/big-data-35-brilliant-and-free-data-sources-for-2016/#19ca978d 
b54d (discussing sources of data including public databases and data collected by 
private companies) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 100. See generally DAVID DE VAUS, ANALYZING SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA: 50 KEY 
PROBLEMS IN DATA ANALYSIS (2002) (explaining methods of analyzing social 
sciences data). 
380 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 357 (2018) 
issues.101 Second, the final box is the ‘information’ box and can be 
thought of as a single unit as well. The output from the 
transformative process should also be subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny.102 Issues such as, is the outcome capable of replication; 
can it be generalized; is it biased or discriminatory on its face; and 
similar issues.103  
It is the transformative process, the middle box, that is semi-
unexplored to date. For example, the transformative process can 
demand that entities and policy makers think about: (1) What is 
allowed/acceptable to go into the transformative process? (2) What 
happens to the data during the transformative process, such as 
(a) what assumptions are allowable; (b) what automations should 
be allowed to occur; (c) what holes (or missing data) is allowed to 
be filled and how should those holes be filled; and (d) What biases 
are allowed, or otherwise permissible? (3) Does what is actually 
spit out match our expectations? Is it problematic on its face? (to 
name but a few).104 
Fundamentally, assuming that the main points of discussion 
presented into the above diagram are correct, the question that 
remains is how to create a governance structure that appreciates 
the risks at the various points, considers the impacts of the risks, 
and attempts to reduce the impact of identified risks through 
mitigation. The following sections break out these issue in greater 
detail. 
                                                                                                     
 101. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (highlighting the questions to ask to determine 
whether expert testimony is reliable).  
 102. See UNIV. OF CAL. MUSEUM OF PALEONTOLOGY, BERKELEY, & REGENTS OF 
THE UNIV. OF CAL., THE SOCIAL SIDE OF SCIENCE: A HUMAN AND COMMUNITY 
ENDEAVOR 6–9 (2013), https://undsci.berkeley.edu/lessons/pdfs/social_side_of_ 
science.pdf (explaining the importance of strict scrutiny of data in the scientific 
community) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 103. See DE VAUS, supra note 100, at 147–48, 152–53 (discussing factors to 
determine whether the data is reliable).  
 104. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (highlighting the questions to ask to determine 
whether expert testimony is reliable).  
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B. Spectrum of Risk Model 
Risk management is the process of identifying risk, assessing 
risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level.105 
Traditionally used in the information technology industry, the 
cornerstone of the process is a risk impact assessment in which the 
entity determines the probabilities and consequences of risk events 
if the event were to occur.106 The results are then used to prioritize 
risks in terms of their importance.107 These rankings allow 
project’s management to strategize resource allocation and to work 
to mitigate “high probability/high consequence risk events.”108 
Within the field, enterprise environments are the emerging 
area.109  
Enterprise environments (e.g., the Internet) offer users 
ubiquitous, cross-boundary access to wide varieties of services, 
applications, and information repositories. Enterprise systems 
engineering is an emerging discipline. It encompasses and 
extends “traditional” systems engineering to create and evolve 
“webs” of systems and systems-of-systems that operate in a 
network-centric way to deliver capabilities via services, data, 
                                                                                                     
 105. GARY STONEBURNER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., RISK 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM 1 (2002), https:// 
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/nis
t800-30.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also Risk Management Approach and Plan, MITRE, 
https://www.mitre.org/publications/systems-engineering-guide/ acquisition-
systems-engineering/risk-management/risk-management-approach-and-plan 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Risk Management Approach & Plan] 
(providing a definition of risk management) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 106. See Risk Management Approach & Plan, supra note 105 (identifying risk 
impact assessments as a key step in the risk management processes).  
 107. See Risk Impact Assessment and Prioritization, MITRE, https://www. 
mitre.org/publications/systems-engineering-guide/acquisition-systems-engineer 
ing/risk-management/risk-impact-assessment-and-prioritization (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Risk Impact Assessment & Prioritization] (explaining 
the use of prioritization and at what step of the risk impact assessment process it 
occurs) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 108. See id. (identifying the benefits associated with prioritizing risk). 
 109. See Risk Management Approach & Plan, supra note 105 (discussing the 
emergence of risk management in enterprises, and specifically in engineering 
field programs). 
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and applications through an interconnected network of 
information and communications technologies.110 
And, while enterprise risk assessment is a growing standard to be 
used by entities when considering the risk of interruption or 
failures in the delivery of a system/program—the principles that 
stand behind the risk assessment can be generalized to produce an 
overarching information governance framework.111  
In the information governance risk assessment, an example of 
a preferred approach could start with “risk” being based on the risk 
of information being used in a manner that is detrimental to an 
individual or entity.112 Thus, the process would seek to identify 
data and /or information and then consider the impact of the use 
of data/information upon various stakeholders.113 Assuming the 
question is not one of mere legal compliance, one can imagine a 
risk management matrix that will document the following items: 
1. Entity Identification, Data/Information in Question, 
 and Intended Use 
2. Risk and Consequences  
3. Probability—probability of the risk occurring 
4. Impact what is the impact on the various stakeholders 
 if the risk should occur 
5. Priority—based on impact and the probability of 
occurrence  
                                                                                                     
 110. See id. (explaining enterprise environments and their aid in the 
advancement of traditional engineering systems). 
 111. See IT Governance, MITRE, https://www.mitre.org/publications/systems-
engineering-guide/enterprise-engineering/enterprise-planning-and-management 
/it-governance (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (explaining the use of prioritization and 
at what step of the risk impact assessment process it occurs) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 112. See What Constitutes Information Governance?, INFOGOV BASICS, https: 
//www.infogovbasics.com/what-is-infogov/what-constitutes-information-governan 
ce (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (defining information governance) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 113. See id. (demonstrating that an information governance risk assessment 
is used to determine the severity in which an individual or entity is impacted in 
the case of irresponsible handling of that individual or entity’s information). 
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6. Mitigation Response—a brief overview of mitigation 
steps to eliminate or reduce the risk.114 
These questions can then guide the development of global 
information governance regime.115 For example, consider the use 
of highly sensitive information, such as a significant medical 
diagnosis.116 The risk of this information being gathered is that it 
could be used to discriminate in a variety of ways.117 The first 
question is to ‘classify’ the information (or data).118 To do this we 
first ask, what entity is seeking to gather/use this information?119 
How do they intend to use the information?120 We then consider, 
will this use have a high impact on the individual (or other 
stakeholders)?121 Moving on we consider what is the probability of 
                                                                                                     
 114. See Risk Impact Assessment & Prioritization, supra note 107 (outlining 
a risk management matrix and including questions to guide the development of 
global information governance). 
 115. See BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCES 15 
(2015) (“Global governance [is] the complex of formal and informal institutions, 
mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, 
citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which 
collective interests on the global plane are articulated, Duties, obligations and 
privileges are established, and differences are mediated through educated 
professionals.”). 
 116. See Ajit Appari & M. Eric Johnson, Information Security and Privacy in 
Healthcare: Current State of Research, 16 (Aug. 2008), www.ists.dartmouth.edu 
/library/416.pdf (noting the highly sensitive nature of information contained in 
medical records) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 117. See Risk Impact Assessment & Prioritization, supra note 107 (describing 
risks associated with unauthorized information gathering).  
 118. See Overview, MITRE, www.mitre.org/capabilities /systems-engineering 
/overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (outlining the best steps to take and 
questions to guide the development of global information governance regime in 
light of risk and sensitive information) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).   
 119. See IT Governance, supra note 111 (explaining how to identify the 
gatherer of the information or data). 
 120. See id. (identifying a gatherer’s specific intent to use certain information 
or data as relevant to the risk assessment). 
 121. See id. (describing the impact of the gatherer’s intended use of 
information or data). 
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the risk occurring?122 Are there mitigation steps that could be put 
in place to lessen the risk or impact?123 
After this information gathering process is complete we can 
classify the data/information.124 In the example of medical 
diagnosis in the hands of an insurer, one can see this information 
should be classified as critical (or highly sensitive).125 This 
information deserves the highest protections and thus should be 
subject to legal protections and prohibitions on the ability to share 
the information beyond a one-time, single use.126 This information 
should not be gathered unless absolutely necessary, should not be 
stored for any longer than absolutely necessary, and should not be 
used in a manner that could negatively impact the individual or 
others.127 This type of data could also be subject to mandatory 
mitigation measures,128 for example if the diagnosis was essential 
for billing purposes the information could be required to be coded 
in generalized terms (long term illness versus asthma).129  
As can be surmised from the brief description of the risk 
model, the model can accommodate various concerns that arise in 
the lifecycle of data and the information web.130 For example, data 
that is deemed critical (that is, data that has a high risk of harm if 
lost), will fall within the highest range of considerations and legal 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. (identifying the probability of risk as a step in the overall 
information governance risk assessment process). 
 123. See id. (explaining that final steps of the information governance risk 
assessment process require an inquiry into whether mitigating steps would 
decrease the overall risk). 
 124. See id. (specifying classifications involved in the risk assessment 
process). 
 125. See Appari & Johnson, supra note 116, at 6 (referencing insurers and 
their relevant interests in obtaining medical information). 
 126. See id. at 3 (outlining the privacy regulations surrounding health 
information and the state of information security research). 
 127. See id. (explaining the threats gathering and storing health information 
pose to privacy). 
 128. See id. at 5 (discussing how effective mitigating measures vary based on 
the intended use of information). 
 129. See id. (describing mitigating measures when the intended use of 
information involves economic value). 
 130. See Risk Impact Assessment & Prioritization, supra note 107 (“Risk cutes 
across the life cycle of systems engineering, and MITRE SEs should be prepared 
to address the risk throughout.”). 
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protections.131 As such, critical data will need to be protected from 
loss (via breach, hack, accidental loss, etc.) and third party use 
through a regulatory structure.132 Non-critical data (data that is 
widely available or is otherwise part of the public knowledge base) 
can be protected, if through industry-created standards.133 The 
model can also accommodate the current concerns that arise in the 
use of data, such as the completion of data to create a digital 
profile.134 The model can thus accommodate the use and thereby 
the impact of the data use within the risk framework.135 For 
example, digital profile creation that is then used to create and 
customize game player experience, could be governed by industry 
standards as the risk of impact upon the individual or society is 
low.136 Digital profile use in the insurance industry or in policing 
might be deemed high risk as these digital profiles may be used as 
mechanisms of discrimination or price inflation and, as such, this 
type of data use would be highly regulated.137  
                                                                                                     
 131.  See Appari & Johnson, supra note 116 (noting legal considerations and 
regulations currently in place that attempt to protect information of all degrees 
of sensitivity). 
 132. See id. (recognizing the need for further advancements of the regulatory 
scheme involving the protection of critical data and potential breaches or third 
party use of that data). 
 133. See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of 
FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015) (discussing how 
data is protected through industry standards). 
 134. See Annum Munir, Learn How to Create a Complete Customer Profile 
Using Data (in 7 Steps), LOCALYTICS (June 3, 2015), http://info.localytics.com/blog/ 
learn-how-to-create-a-complete-customer-profile-using-data-in-7-steps 
(explaining how to use data to create a customer profile) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 135. See Risk Impact Assessment & Prioritization, supra note 107 (discussing 
risk assessment model). 
 136. See Jukka Vahlo et al., Digital Game Dynamics Preferences and Player 
Types, 22 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 88, 88 (providing “new knowledge on 
how players’ gaming preferences and different types of digital games can be 
analyzed within a single research framework based on activity theoretical 
considerations and game design concepts”). 
 137. ACCENTUREDIGITAL, DIGITAL POLICING POWERED BY ANALYTICS: 
ACTIONABLE PUBLIC SAFETY INSIGHTS 2, 4–8 (2016), https://www.accenture.com/ 
t20170412T030029Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-34/Accenture-Digital-Policing-
Powered-by-Analytics.pdf#zoom=50 (discussing the use of analytics to assist 
police officers) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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In addition, the enterprise risk assessment can be used on an 
individual (or more local) level as well.138 Locally, a business may 
use the model, for example to determine the use of a particular 
algorithm in a specific situation.139  
C. Industry Key Recommendations 
As one would imagine, we are most likely a long way from the 
creation of a framework to govern the regulation of the 
transformative process.140 As such, industry should consider what 
steps it can and should take to begin the process of discovering the 
important aspects of the emerging governance. 
One of the better examples of grassroots, industry-based 
technology regulation exists in the area of Bluetooth.141 The 
Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) is the body that oversees 
the development of Bluetooth standards and the licensing of the 
Bluetooth technologies and trademarks to manufacturers.142 The 
SIG is a not-for-profit, non-stock corporation which does not make, 
manufacture or sell Bluetooth enabled products.143 Any company 
incorporating Bluetooth wireless technology into products, using 
the technology to offer goods and services or simply re-branding a 
product with Bluetooth technology, must become a member of the 
                                                                                                     
 138. See KAREN HARDY, MANAGING RISK IN GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 9 (2d ed. 2010), https://enterrasolutions.com/ 
media/docs/2013/09/RiskinGovernment.pdf (highlighting the benefits of the risk 
assessment framework when applied to at the individual level) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 139. See id. at 10 (“Understanding and managing risk is essential for any 
organization, public or private. In the private sector, risk management is a widely 
accepted practice designed to control risks that could lead to a business failure if 
not properly managed.”). 
 140. See Risk Management Approach & Plan, supra note 105 (noting that at 
the enterprise level, governance and complexity risks become more apparent). 
 141. See Bluetooth SIG, REVOLVY, https://www.revolvy.com/main/index. 
php?s=Bluetooth%20SIG&item_type=topic (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (describing 
the organizational structure of the Bluetooth group and identifying the Bluetooth 
group as an important body with significant oversight or development standards 
in the industry) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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Bluetooth SIG.144 As such, Bluetooth SIG is able to create a 
membership of users that must complete the qualification and 
declaration process for their Bluetooth enabled product(s) to 
demonstrate and declare compliance to the Membership 
Agreements.145  
I have written before about the ability of a technology 
developer to create a “captured” participation group and to insist 
that participants comply with standards to remain part of the user 
group.146 One classic example is Apple or Facebook, who both 
create log in barriers to entry and remove members who fail to 
comply with platform rules. Industries that use the “captured” 
participants model are at an advantage to others because 
membership is revocable.147 It is however, these industries that 
also have an incentive to monitor behavior and as such, may just 
be those with the greatest knowledge in community expectations 
going forward.148 
In terms of the general industry guidance, it is possible to 
create user agreements that place restrictions upon data and insist 
upon compliance with existing community standards and laws.149 
And, although not discussed below, it is one of the easiest and 
possibly one of the more effective means to influence community 
and industry standards.150 
That does not mean that industry must start from the 
beginning, some guidance already exists.151 To this end, 
                                                                                                     
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Anjanette Raymond, The Dilemma of Private Justice Systems: Big 
Data Sources, the Cloud and Predictive Analytics, 35 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1A, 
3A (2015) (discussing the binding impacts that big data and the continued 
advancements in technology have on consumers and users).  
 147. See id. (describing information gathering techniques employed by certain 
technology developers, which had negative effects on participants). 
 148. See id. at 5A (noting the incentive industries collecting information have 
to monitor gathering techniques and protect the community accordingly).  
 149. See Appari & Johnson, supra note 116, at 4–5 (outlining current 
regulations and laws affecting information gathering).   
 150. See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in 
the Law of Contract, 58 Emory L. J. 1401, 1455 (2009) (discussing the evolution 
of contracts and industry standards). 
 151. See Appari & Johnson, supra note 116, at 10–11 (noting the general 
industry guidance currently in place and the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of 
that guidance). 
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commentators have suggested the following key recommendations 
for any industry to consider as a first step in creating a framework 
for information governance.152 
1. Incorporate Impact Assessment 
According to Information Commissioners Office in the United 
Kingdom, privacy impact assessments (PIAs) “are a tool which can 
help organizations identify the most effective way to comply with 
their data protection obligations and meet individuals’ 
expectations of privacy.”153 While the author’s hesitation has 
already been written about, with the continued use of the term 
‘privacy,’ it is important to note the full breadth of its use within 
this context and within this particular assessment, privacy 
includes physical and informational privacy,154 including: 
[T]he ability of a person to control, edit, manage and 
delete information about themselves and to decide how 
and to what extent such information is communicated to 
others. Intrusion can come in the form of collection of 
excessive personal information, disclosure of personal 
information without consent and misuse of such 
information.155 
This is a much broader conceptualization of privacy than 
exists in the United States and is thus a good reminder to always 
consider definitions and cultural influence in the development and 
commentary on policy.156 The British conceptualization of the 
impact assessment is to “minimizing . . . the risk of harm through 
                                                                                                     
 152. See generally SUSAN MEAKIN, INFORMATION GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 2016–2018 (2016), http://www.rdash.nhs.uk/wp-cont 
ent/uploads/2014/06/IG-Strategic-Framework-v2-20162018.pdf (discussing how 
to create a framework for information governance) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 153. INFO. COMM’RS OFF., CONDUCTING PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS CODE OF 
PRACTICE 4 (2014) [hereinafter ICO] (emphasis added) https://ico.org.uk/media/for 
organisations/documents/1595/pia-code-of-practice.pdf (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 154. See id. (noting the expanded breadth of the term privacy in the context 
of impact assessments). 
 155. Id. at 6.  
 156. See PRIVACY IN AMERICA: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 248 (William 
Aspray & Philip Doty eds., 2011) (discussing privacy in the United States). 
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use or misuse of personal information.”157 While the entire 
coverage of the Code is too large for inclusion in this paper, the 
Code provides numerous explanations, flow charts, formative 
questions, and explanations to assist organizations in conducting 
the assessment and all provided with an eye toward compliance 
with the Data Protection Act.158 Most relevant for the paper is the 
key consideration that “[a]s part of the PIA process organizations 
should describe how information is collected, stored, used and 
deleted. They should explain what information is used, what it is 
used for and who will have access to it.”159 
Consider a simple example of an impact assessment, that is 
not necessarily privacy focused, but is nevertheless an example of 
how a broad impact assessment can measure impact risks based 
upon the impact of the particular use on multiple stakeholders. 
Consider the transformative process (middle box) mentioned 
above. If the data that is entered allows gender to be a data point 
within the transformative process, the designer should be expected 
to consider if the use of gender is impactful to the overall output. 
If so, and the impact is a positive one, then gender may be 
appropriate under the circumstances. But, if gender introduces 
negative impacts, such as the introduction of discrimination, 
without the need for such an introduction—then gender should be 
eliminated from inclusion.  
Now, consider a real-world example: for a very long time the 
medical community assumed, despite years of research, that heart 
attacks presented in the same manner across individuals.160 It 
turns out the research was incomplete.161 It seems that gender, 
                                                                                                     
 157. ICO, supra note 153, at 7. 
 158. See id. (noting that neither compliance with the Code nor completion of 
the impact assessment is a requirement of the Data Protection Act). 
 159. Id. at 19. 
 160. See Colleen Story, Symptoms of a Heart Attack, HEATHLINE (Apr. 10, 
2012), http://www.healthline.com/health/heart-disease/heart-attack-symptoms# 
symptoms-in-men3 (noting that symptoms of heart attacks show up in different 
ways and depend on a number of different factors) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 161. See Vidhi Doshi, Why Doctors Still Misunderstand Heart Disease in 
Women, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive 
/2015/10/heart-disease-women/412495/ (discussing the misdiagnosis of heart 
attacks in women because studies of men’s symptoms were used to diagnose 
women and women’s symptoms were not studied until the ’90s) (on file with the 
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when considering heart attack presenting symptoms, is a material 
factor.162 The exclusion of gender from the conversation created an 
unreliable and very dangerous generalization.163 In this instance, 
gender as data should have been considered within the 
conversation.164 Thus, gender should have been considered. But of 
course, there are times when gender is an unnecessary 
consideration and may in fact do nothing but capture societies 
biases within the transformative process.165 Turns out, despite 
what you may believe, women are not worse drivers than men 
when “worse drivers” are measured in terms of automobile 
accidents.166 If designers are allowed or machine learning 
processes to capture this poor assumption, then designers need to 
mitigate for that negative impact.167 
Despite what is a clear need, as demonstrated above, in most 
instances the existing frameworks do not envision codes of conduct 
or best practices for the deployment of algorithms that are built 
upon machine learning, and thus continual data gathering that is 
then used to create information.168 This is the area that should be 
                                                                                                     
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 162. See id. (discussing different heart attack symptoms in men and women). 
 163. See id. (highlighting the death of Nancy Larko, who died from a 
misdiagnosed heart attack).  
 164. See id. (discussing the misdiagnosis of heart attacks in women because 
studies focused on the symptoms in men). 
 165. See Steven Pinker & Elizabeth S. Spelke, The Science of Gender and 
Science Pinker Vs. Spelke: A Debate, EDGE (May 16, 2005), https://www.edge.org/ 
event/the-science-of-gender-and-science-pinker-vs-spelke-a-debate (highlighting 
that there is a difference between bias and actual genetic differences in men and 
women) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
 166. See John Stossel, Are Women Worse Drivers Than Men?, ABC NEWS (May 
7, 2017), http://abc news.go.com/2020/story?id=3148281&page=1 (explaining that 
it is a myth that women are worse drivers than men) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 167. See Tom Simonite, Machines Taught by Photos Learn a Sexist View of 
Women, WIRED (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/machines-taught-by 
-photos-learn-a-sexist-view-of-women/ (explaining how machine-learning 
software  amplified the unintentional biases of its programmers) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 168. See Xavier Amatriain, The Best Practices For Training Machine 
Learning Models, FORBES (May 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/ 
2017/05/10/the-best-practices-for-training-machine-learning-models/#47b0f71d7 
de8 (describing the best practices for training machine-learning software, 
including adding more data) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
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added into consideration (although, admittedly this area of use 
would not yet be covered by the DPA).169 Nevertheless, the 
considerations of impact can still stand as guiding principles 
within the wider use of an impact assessment. For example, 
currently, machine learning translation and the google translate 
algorithm are all the rage as an ever growing number of languages 
are capable of translation.170 Although speech recognition and 
translation are vastly better than they have ever been,171 they still 
have a long way to go, especially when attempting to translate 
languages that lack standard, predictable rules and patterns.172 
English is incredibly difficult for numerous reasons,173 as anyone 
attempting to sort through colloquial phrasing and double use of 
words can attest to, everything is contextual. 
One issue currently being considered amongst data scientists 
is the manner to measure “better” translations, which 
commentators argue ask researchers to consider the differences in 
translations produced from different models and to determine 
which translation more closely resembles the sentence, including 
meaning and phrasing.174 Turns out, even poorly translated 
                                                                                                     
Rights & Social Justice). 
 169. See generally Data Protection Act 1998, c.29 (Eng.) (protecting “personal 
data” defined as any data that can be used to identify an individual and 
proscribing certain uses of that data). 
 170. See Luba Belokon, Machine Learning Translation and the Google 
Translate Algorithm, DATA SCI. CENT. (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.datascience 
central.com/profiles/blogs/machine-learning-translation-and-the-google-translat 
e-algorithm (providing a great explanation of machine learning translation and 
the Google Translate algorithm) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 171. See Language: Finding a Voice, ECONOMIST (May 1, 2017), http://www. 
economist.com/technology-quarterly/2017-05-01/language (“Computers have got 
much better at translation, voice recognition and speech synthesis, . . .  they still 
don’t understand the meaning of language.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 172. See id. (praising the advancements society made in speech recognition 
and language translation thus far but recognizing that languages which lack 
predictable patterns pose more difficult tasks and require further progress be 
made). 
 173. See id. (identifying English as a language which poses difficulties in 
certain advancements in language recognitions and translations). 
 174. See Daniil Korbut, Machine Learning Translation and the Google 
Translate Algorithm: The basic principles of machine translation engines, STATS 
& BOTS (Aug. 1, 2017), https://blog.statsbot.co/machine-learning-translation-96f0 
ed8f19e4 (highlighting how Google Translate scans millions of documents in order 
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sentences can lead to someone understanding the main idea of the 
sentence, but the phrasing and language patterns add context.175  
Why might all of this matter, especially in light of impact 
assessments? Imagine driving down a road and the driving 
assistant wishes for you to “turn left on Higgins.” In order to 
translate this, an algorithm will use one of several possible 
translator algorithms and provide instructions that are most likely 
close to the direction that would have been given in English, but, 
as everyone who drives with one of these driving assistants knows, 
sometimes the program simply does not get it right.176 For an 
impact assessment to be useful, we have to be able to anticipate 
the impact on these mistakes upon the user.177  
Fortunately, the spoken word, in situations of driving, can 
often be corroborated or verified by visual cues, such as road signs, 
and available turning lanes, and thus, a poor translation may have 
less impact in these situations.178 The absence of visual cues—or 
other sources of data that can be used to verify, support and 
provide context can in fact cause errors in the interpretation, 
communication or translation. For example, consider a situation in 
which police officers use translation algorithms to communicate 
with someone speaking another language in a real world setting. 
The potential absence of visual cues coupled with the intensity of 
a stressful event the individual is experiencing, may drastically 
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(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEL/04/22/travel.gps.troubles/ind 
ex.html (explaining how the GPS system occasionally fails to guide drivers) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 177. See Dan Bilefsky, GPS Mix-Up Brings Wrong Turn, and Celebrity, to an 
American in Iceland, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
02/05/world/europe/iceland-american-tourist-gps.html (detailing a comedic 
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his GPS) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 178. See Weiss, supra note 176 (discussing how drivers should not over-trust 
their GPS systems when there are alternative sources of direction). 
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alter the situation for all involved. The police officer may assume 
the translation is of assistance, while the individual may receive 
an oddly worded, out of context translation. The translation may 
not help the situation and may have a drastically negative impact 
upon the individual who cannot understand the police officer’s 
questions.179 Thus, a simple measure of the program is not enough 
as the same exact program will have drastically different impacts 
based upon the particular use of the instrument.180 
2. Insist Upon Privacy by Design 
While the intent of this Article is not to discuss cyber-security, 
this Paper would be incomplete without consideration of Privacy 
by Design within the industry recommendation section. Privacy by 
Design tends to encompass some of the principles that could be 
added into the impact-based risk assessment.181 As such, a brief 
overview is necessary. 
Privacy by Design, also known as “data protection by design 
and by default,” is the design approach that will soon become a 
legal requirement in the E.U.182 Within the design approach, the 
use of technology-based supports protect privacy.183 For example, 
data controllers will be obliged to take “appropriate technical and 
organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, only 
personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the 
processing are processed,”184 such as: anonymization techniques, 
security measures to prevent data misuse, data minimization 
measures, purpose limitation and data segregation measures, and 
                                                                                                     
 179. See VA. CODE § 18.2-464 (2017) (treating failure to obey lawful order of a 
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 184. Id. 
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restrictions on meta data.185 In terms of the broader discussion, 
Privacy by Design is an integral part of the conversation because 
the design process is an essential mitigation consideration in the 
risk assessment.186 Yet, it should be noted that the design process 
in this instance focuses more on security and less on the 
transformative process.187  
3. Eliminate Emotionally Crafted Narratives and Bad 
Data Science 
USA Today authors Jefferson Graham and Laura Schulte 
described what some commentators consider a disturbing new use 
of technology that has Wisconsin workers voluntarily embedded 
with microchips to facilitate payment of purchases from workplace 
vending machines.188 Graham and Schulte explained the 
sentiment of supervisor of the company, Three Square Market 
President Patrick McMullan, who captured the emotionally 
charged, illogical concerns: 
The chip is not a tracker nor does it have GPS in it, so the boss 
can’t track your movements, company officials say. Still, to 
those who worry about Big Brother having more control over 
our lives, Three Square Market President Patrick McMullan 
says you should, “take your cell phone and throw it away.”189 
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Of course, the comparison of what cell phones track misses the 
point of the work place privacy issues and fails to appreciate the 
fallacy employed to outright reject a valid concern, especially in 
light of employees’ inferior bargaining position.190 Slippery slopes 
and similar fallacies are frequently employed to reject outright 
otherwise valid concerns.191 Industry insiders must challenge this 
type of “you have already lost all your ability to complain” 
arguments. These and other arguments serve to stifle discussion 
and are used in fear mongering narratives that simply must 
stop.192  
Moreover, data scientists must push back on an industry that 
insists upon no adherence to science and the guiding principle of 
the discipline, such as verification and informed consent.193 This 
author previously wrote about the litany of “projects” undertaken 
with the full knowledge and expectation that individuals will be 
impacted yet, that impact is not considered, controlled, or 
monitored for harmful effects.194 Facebook—and its various 
“adjustments”—have caused outrage amongst commentators and 
social scientists195 because the impact upon individuals, in at least 
some cases, is irrefutable.196 Data scientists and others must be 
held to the same standards of any social scientist, such as informed 
consent and human subject approval processes.197 
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Finally, the industry must stop using narratives that 
misrepresent or overgeneralize the issues or the actual technology 
being deployed.198 Narratives are generally understood as 
storytelling “wherein the choice of what data to plot, and how, is 
tailored to the message the authors want to deliver.”199 While 
research generally supports the use of narratives to explain 
scientific information to a non-scientist,200 the field also explored 
the ethical aspects of the use of narratives to persuade, instead of 
inform.201 The distinction between the two becomes especially 
relevant in light of research that reveals that “narratives can also 
perpetuate misinformation and inaccuracies about science or 
about scientists themselves.”202 In fact, research into science based 
narratives suggests that because narratives are not subject to the 
same truth requirements as logical-scientific communications, the 
message is not easily countered.203 In fact, accepted narratives are 
trusted so much that individuals rarely allow evidence to 
contradict the narrative.204 Instead, evidence is altered to fit their 
narratives.205 
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While some may argue that the current technology-based 
conversations should not be considered within the realm of science, 
one needs only to examine the arguments presented by the 
industry to appreciate the need for technology-based narratives is 
justified for the exact same reason as science-based narratives. 
Simply put, without the narrative no one will understand. While 
this justification is likely true, the purpose of the narrative is 
obliterated in the explanation. Science seeks to use narratives to 
inform and engage the larger community,206 while the technology 
industry often utilizes narratives to further hide the issue.207 The 
industry itself must begin to take control of these narratives and 
insist that narratives serve a supported purpose—that is to inform 
and engage—and should be rejected if the purpose is to 
oversimplify or misrepresent the technology being described.  
4. Create Auditable Machine Learning Algorithms 
While “auditing” an algorithm might sound like an impossible 
process, (and in the case of machine learning, unstructured data—
based algorithms is most likely impossible) auditing can occur if 
we use a historically defined process within the fields of psychology 
and law.208 Amongst other aspects of mental health treatment 
possibilities, cognitive behavioral therapy uses outwardly visible 
inappropriate or undesirable behaviors such as indicators of 
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maladaptive thinking in individuals.209 In general, inappropriate 
or undesired behaviors are evidence of maladaptive thinking.210 
Assisting individuals in identifying undesired behaviors and 
examining the maladaptive thinking that leads to the repetition of 
those behaviors, is often a first approach to treatment in this 
field.211 In a similar manner, outcomes—the information 
produced—can be examined for maladaptive machine logic, bad 
data, or other contaminants in the outcome.212 It is the 
examination of outputs that leads to the need for closer scrutiny.213  
While this process may sound daunting, it is, in fact, a process 
already used, although usually under well controlled 
circumstances.214 For example, the now infamous Google search 
debacles.215 In June of 2016, the Google search engine revealed 
underlying bias in its search algorithm when a search for “three 
white teenagers” turned up pictures of happy young white people, 
but the search of “three black teenagers” produced images of young 
black people in mug shots.216 Google also came under fire in July 
2015 when its photo app autonomously labeled a pair of black 
friends as animals.217 The engineer in charge of the photo app 
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believed the underlying program was fine, but the data used 
during training of the algorithm was “faulty” intimating that 
Google may not have appropriately trained the AI.218 Of course, the 
ability to view undesired outputs such as this is the first step in 
identifying the underlying issue that may have led to the output.219 
In this manner, algorithms are auditable.  
In fact, this author previously argued that some AI based 
algorithms, such as those in highly impactful areas that deprive 
individuals of constitutionally protected rights, should be subject 
to audits.220 For example, there is wide concern about the use of AI 
based pattern recognition that is currently occurring in policing, 
probation, and parole.221 Systems such as this are highly impactful 
on personal liberty and should thus be subject to the most 
stringent of review.222 As such, it is possible that the “perfect” data 
set could be developed.223 This data set could then be fed into the 
system to ensure the outputs were not out of line with expected 
outcomes.224 If the outcomes did not correspond with expected 
outcomes, one could presume that the AI “learned” a bias it must 
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address.225 Although this process is probably difficult to imagine, 
it is, in fact, a process used amongst the industry to “train” systems 
and to build in corrective measures.226 
Moreover, algorithms may be able to audit other algorithms.227 
While this may seem like HAL as the mechanism to turn off HAL 
Jr.,228 it is in fact, a genuine possibility. 229 According to UK, “the 
2016 International Conference on Data Mining showed a technique 
for algorithmic auditing that was evidenced as being effective at 
identifying discrete factors that influence the decisions made by 
algorithms.”230 While in the U.S., consultant companies are 
already being set up that specialize in providing algorithmic 
auditing services to their clients.231 
And, while it is the case that it may be difficult to explain the 
inner workings of AI, processes are being developed every day that 
bring us closer to this potential reality.232 For example: 
Other methods are being developed in natural language 
generation (NLG) to output text that explains why or how a 
decision was reached. Imagine if your favorite machine learning 
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library, say scikit-learn, could explain in a sentence why a 
particular input case was classified the way it was.233 
While explanations for the more advanced AI based systems may 
be years away, today we should be entitled to expect the ability to 
audit algorithms when the algorithm either uses sensitive/critical 
data or when the impact of the outcomes is significant.234  
D. Recommendations for Policy Makers 
Policy makers also face a daunting task when considering 
issues surrounding the transformative process.235 The first issue 
that must be considered is the overall framework that should be 
deployed within the area.236 And of course, that requires a true 
conversation to occur to develop the areas upon which the 
framework will be built.237 This section seeks to begin that 
conversation, by returning to the legal frameworks and industry 
recommendations discussed above and considering these within 
the creation of the framework.238  
1. Reject the Privacy Narrative 
Reject the narrative surrounding privacy as the interest that 
we seek to protect. As discussed above, privacy law originally 
envisioned governmental intrusion.239 Today, the privacy 
conceptualization has expanded to include information that we 
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seek to shield from prying eyes.240 In general, this information is 
considered sensitive—for a variety of reasons—and as such should 
be allowed to remain private.241 However, if information is private, 
should one not be expected to protect it as important information 
that he/she values keeping private and should he/she not be 
allowed to, therefore, shield it from everyone, but for incredibly 
limited exceptions?  
Individuals seeking to protect information as private find the 
task difficult to achieve.242 For example, in January 2017 
DuckDuckGo conducted A Study on Private Browsing: Consumer 
Usage, Knowledge, and Thoughts.243 Almost unsurprisingly, the 
results clearly show a true confusion among users about what 
exactly privacy entails in an online environment.244 According to 
the study, “46% of Americans have used Private Browsing” while 
those using it reported the “number one reason people use Private 
Browsing is ‘Embarrassing Searches.’”245 However, “76% of 
Americans who use Private Browsing cannot accurately identify 
the privacy benefit it provides.”246 In fact, “41.0 ±2.5% believe that 
Private Browsing Prevents websites from tracking me” and “39.1 
±2.6% believe that Private Browsing Prevents ads from tracking 
me.”247 And, do not assume this is a generational gap, as in general 
the misconceptions about Private Browsing are consistent.248 Of 
course, when individuals are told about the true protections 
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provided from private browsing “65.9 ±2.4% feel ‘Surprised’, 
‘Misled’, ‘Confused’ or ‘Vulnerable.’”249 Private and privacy do not 
mean what people think they mean—and thus, should be 
abandoned as safe and secure—the private information narrative 
is misleading and misunderstood.250 
Individuals often have little choice in sharing information that 
everyone considers private, as this type of information is often used 
as a means to authenticate identity in the online world.251 As such, 
much of my private information is shared, by myself, multiple 
times a day, with little choice in the matter, despite a true desire 
to protect it as private. Consider one’s birthday, place of birth, and 
mother’s maiden name—all of this information is used as security 
questions to establish identity to reconnect to certain accounts. 
Under the concept of privacy, how can one argue for this 
information to remain private when it is so readily share it over 
and over online every day? And that, of course, ignores the 
individuals who share this information and more on easily 
searched websites such as Facebook and Instagram.  
Finally, consider one of the most heralded authentication 
devices: the social security number.252 While most people assume 
a social security number is random—or otherwise sequential—
based on some arbitrary system, in fact social security numbers 
are based upon simple bits of data.253 Data that is often widely 
available and used often by individuals—even published on 
Facebook.254 That means your social security number can be 
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guessed, with shocking accuracy, from nothing more than publicly 
available information, information that individuals regularly and 
publicly display.255 According to Alessandro Acquisti, assistant 
professor of information technology and public policy at Carnegie 
Mellon University, “our work shows that Social Security numbers 
are compromised as authentication devices, because they are 
predictable from public data.”256 In fact, researchers found that it 
is possible to guess many—if not all—of the nine digits in an 
individual’s Social Security number using publicly available 
information, as many could be guessed by simply knowing a 
person’s birth data.257 This is but one example of publicly available 
data being used to discover private data. And, it is a great example 
of the looming debate; how can one ever argue for the need for 
privacy, when the individual has publicly shared the information? 
All that has occurred is that an entity has gathered public 
information and compiled it to create an incredibly accurate 
profile, one that can easily lead to what many thinks of as private 
information.258 Privacy must be abandoned as the guiding 
principle, as we publicly share too much information to 
realistically ever argue that information is private.259  
Instead, U.S. citizens should use terminology such as sensitive 
and secure information to alleviate the confusion and reduce the 
potential to fall into the trap of using existing privacy laws as 
guidance.260 Surely a social security number, if it is to continue to 
be used as an authentication device, should be labeled as sensitive 
                                                                                                     
from a variety of sources, including voter registration lists and commercial 
databases. What’s more, many people now self-publish this information as part of 
their personal profiles on blogs and social networking sites.”). 
 255. See id. (“Researchers have found that it is possible to guess many—if not 
all—of the nine digits in an individual’s Social Security number using publicly 
available information”). 
 256. Id.  
 257. See id. (“Many numbers could be guessed at by simply knowing a person’s 
birth data, the researchers from Carnegie Mellon University said.”). 
 258. See id. (“‘We can’t pretend anymore that SSNs can be kept secret,’ said 
Peter Swire, a law professor at Ohio State University and chief counselor for 
privacy during the Clinton administration.”). 
 259. See id. (discussing the need for new approaches to identification due to 
the saturation of personal information on social media). 
 260. See Dwoskin & Timberg, supra note 5 (showing that these terms are 
already being used to a certain extent). 
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and thus has a high need of securing the information, regardless 
of how it was obtained.  
Moreover, the terminology allows individuals to focus on the 
important aspect of the conversation; this information is not 
private, it is important to protect.261 Thus, individuals have a 
responsibility to protect the information and gain the right to not 
disclose the information unless it is information that is important 
to the entity requesting the information.262 
2. Reject Property as the Guiding Law 
Issues of ownership of data—in both a personal and business 
context—have become an important consideration in terms of 
governance.263 Despite a well-established history of property law, 
there is surprising uncertainty in the law regarding the ownership 
of information contained in records, on forms, and in other data 
repositories.264 In general, the law regards records holding data as 
property owned by their creators, as was examined briefly above. 
But the real question is whether the data is owned at all.265  
There are strong arguments that information cannot be 
owned, a problem that can be expected to intensify as paper records 
give way to a freely moving information on an electronic 
highway.266 As Professor Mark Hall has observed when 
                                                                                                     
 261. See id. (illustrating this fact is the prevalence of consumer data online, 
such as credit and debit purchase information). 
 262. See id. (highlighting this problem is Google’s ability to collect “a trove of 
highly sensitive information . . . without revealing how they got the information 
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 263. See Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Integrated 
Electronic Medical Records, WAKE FOREST UNIV. L. STUD., Paper No. 1334963, at 
2 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334963 (“All 
parties are looking to the law to define the ownership, control, and 
commercialization potential of medical information. How these issues are 
resolved ultimately will determine which information network models are 
economically viable and what form they will take.”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 264. See id. at 12 (explaining the various viewpoints regarding the ownership 
of medical records).  
 265. See id. (examining the legal uncertainty regarding who owns the 
information contained in medical records). 
 266. See id. at 11 (“The law’s uncertainty over ownership and control of 
medical information is widely regarded as a major barrier to effective networking 
406 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 357 (2018) 
considering medical records “[o]wnership was never much in doubt 
in an age of paper-based records”267 because the paper record 
containing the information was owned by its creator.268 The 
electronic information age has ushered in an era in which the 
content of information can be “digitized and freed from any 
particular storage medium.”269 In the paper-based world one could 
think of ownership and control as often found in tandem and 
certainly the relinquishing of control did not equate to the 
relinquishing of ownership (think of your car).270 In the digital 
world, this is no longer the case as it is difficult—or nearly 
impossible—to identify the owner, and being legally in control of 
information is often a status to be avoided as it incurs heightened 
responsibilities.271 
Unfortunately, the absence of clearly defined property rights 
within the area likely has significant consequences to governance 
and property-based rights.272 As argued many times before, 
uncertain legal positions allow parties to attempt to simply to 
stake a claim.273 In the paper-based world, claiming space forces a 
negotiation toward a contractual settlement that determines 
respective rights.274  
Of course, the outcomes are only binding on the immediate 
parties, and the process of negotiation is an expensive barrier.275 
                                                                                                     
of EMRs and policy analysts consider the legal status of medical information to 
be a critical question at or near the top of issues needing resolution.”). 
 267. Id. at 1. 
 268. See id. (discussing the confusion that digitizing records has created). 
 269. Id.  
 270. See id. at 10 (describing the trustee model that places the 
patient-controlled record into the control of an “infomediary” or “records bank”). 
 271. See id. at 14 (writing about how divided control over records make it 
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 272. See id. at 17 (discussing the challenges of digitizing medical records and 
the tragedy of the anti-commons). 
 273. See id. at 9 (“If legal positions are uncertain, parties can still attempt 
simply to stake a claim, forcing a negotiation toward a contractual settlement 
that determines respective rights, but such contracts bind only the immediate 
parties, and the process of negotiation is an expensive barrier.”). 
 274. See id. (“Ownership was never much in doubt in an age of paper-based 
records, but now that information content can be easily digitized and freed from 
any particular storage medium, confusion reigns.”). 
 275. See id. (discussing the parties bound by negotiations). 
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As such, it is argued that property rights must be clearly 
established so that the respective parties know their legal default 
positions.276 In the digital world, this position is fraught with 
difficulty as the negotiations never truly materialize.277 Instead, 
large scale technology creators control the market and limit entry 
to those that agree to their conceptualization of the property rights 
control.278 Thus, even if property rights were established, the 
existence of consent-based membership would allow the powerful 
to reallocate the ownership rights as a term of entry into the 
system.279 
One also must consider the problems created—or the clever 
work arounds—that currently exist in overcoming both the 
ownership and control dilemmas.280 In terms of ownership, if an 
individual is allowed to own his or her digital profile and the 
information it contains, at what point is the record merely data 
and incapable of ownership? Consider a birthdate in a database. 
When it is one person’s birthdate such that it is attached to 
identifying information, it has corresponding ownership rights, but 
when it is placed within a large database of anonymized data, it is 
no longer capable of ownership.281 It is simply a number.  
Maybe more importantly, owned data allows individuals to 
place limits on its use, which may fail to fill society’s need to use 
data in a beneficial manner.282 Consider smart cities, natural 
disasters, and medical emergencies. Should individuals be allowed 
to own data that prevents social benefit? Should they be allowed to 
                                                                                                     
 276.  See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An 
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381, 2387, 2403, 2395 (1996) (applying 
Coase’s theorem to property rights in personal information). 
 277. See Hall, supra note 263, at 9–10 (“[U]ncertain legal rights over valuable 
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 279. See id. at 12 (explaining the expensive barrier that negotiating creates). 
 280. See id. at 29 (describing the network externalities created by 
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profit from it? Should the entity that gathers it be allowed to profit 
from it if the individual cannot? Of course, that is not to mention 
the obvious issue with data needing to be located and subjected to 
a particular property regime, a topic for another day. 
It is a lengthy discussion that prompted many scholars and 
policy makers to abandon the ownership discussion as it is fraught 
with difficulties and, while intriguing as academic debate, it stands 
in the way of the creation of a governance regime.283 As such, many 
now consider control to be the guiding paradigm that ignores the 
ownership issue and instead places responsibility upon the entity 
that controls the data.284 Time will tell if this basic shift in the 
discussion allows the discussions to advance. The author fears by 
ignoring the true issue, we as a society will remain beholden to 
those that craft overly broad and wide sweeping permissions 
through the use of ubiquitous online contracts.285  
3. Reject Solutions Designed in a Paper Based World 
This Article does not suggest that the paper-based world 
should not be a large consideration in the creation of policy. In fact, 
the impact of data loss created in the paper world remains a 
constant concern.286 For example, in August of 2017,health insurer 
Aetna allegedly “revealed 12,000 patients’ HIV statuses by sending 
letters with a giant envelope ‘window’ that exposed confidential 
information.”287 Data loss occurs in the paper-based world as 
well—and often—and thus, it must be considered within the scope 
of any governance frameworks.288 As noted by the Executive 
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property and ownership to patient medical information in the U.S.). 
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 286. See Mia De Graaf, Aetna Revealed 12,000 Patients’ HIV Statuses by 
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Director of the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania Ronda B. 
Goldfein, “Aetna letters casual disclosure of a person’s HIV status 
or use of HIV medication is far more than a technical violation of 
the law . ‘It creates a tangible risk of violence, discrimination and 
other trauma.’”289 As Executive Director Goldfein notes, it is the 
impact of such disclosure upon the individual that has the 
potential to cause the greatest damage.290 The paper-based world 
is an important consideration, but deploying informed consent 
based in a copious amount of information being delivered with the 
use of click wrap agreements to authenticate consent are historical 
paper-based solutions that no longer stand the test of time in the 
digital world.291 
This author has written numerous times about the ability of 
technology to greatly reduce or completely eliminate the problems 
associated with the “must, rush, and trust” based consent world.292 
Simply put, no one—literally no one—pays attention to the terms 
presented to us.293 In fact, very few people even skim the 
information presented.294 And, the vast majority of individuals 
have become apathetic in the situation as they believe reading 
terms are a waste of time as they have no bargaining power and 
no real choice but to click and move on.295 Moreover, presenting 
drastically one-sided terms is not even a barrier to consent as 
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 290. See id. (“Sally Friedman, Legal Director of the Legal Action Center in 
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individuals believe that in many circumstances being a member of 
the community demands participation in the digitally connected 
world, such as Facebook. Individuals feel they have no real choice 
but to agree to the terms created and presented to them.  
Of course, inroads are being made to improve the bargaining 
power of individuals. Smart contracts, information presented to 
explain terms, and mechanisms designed to encourage (or even 
force) individuals to read and assent to particular highly important 
terms are all being deployed. Yet, little incentive exists for many 
digital providers to deploy the technology as the ubiquitous 
presentation of click-based terms has created a system where 
individuals have already signed away their rights and are now 
completely apathetic to the process. 
4. Embrace Being Uncomfortable 
It should be noted, the deployment of advanced AI—even if 
done perfectly—can lead to uncomfortable patterns emerging. 
Many of these discoveries will be impossible to ignore once 
revealed. For example, Stanford University social psychologist and 
2014 MacArthur fellow Jennifer Lynn Eberhardt is using machine 
intelligence to develop speech recognition and transcript analysis 
software for policing.296 Her team is examining transcripts from 
traffic stops to recognize patterns of racial disparity, and the 
team’s results are not necessarily unexpected but are nonetheless 
quite troubling.297 Her team discovered that “officers were more 
likely to ask questions of black drivers, less likely to state a reason 
for pulling them over, and less likely to use respectful language.”298 
This outcome should make readers uncomfortable, and we will all 
have to become accustomed to that uncomfortableness because 
advanced AI often reveals patterns our human consciousness seeks 
to ignore.  
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Of course, this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to 
these types of disparity.299 Consider the research conducted by 
Cornell researchers Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich 
examining judicial decision making. Highlighting the findings, 
they summarize: 
A wide range of experimental and field studies reveal that 
several extra-legal factors influence judicial decision making. 
Demographic characteristics of judges and litigants affect 
judges’ decisions. Judges also rely heavily on intuitive 
reasoning in deciding cases, making them vulnerable to the use 
of mental shortcuts that can lead to mistakes. Furthermore, 
judges sometimes rely on facts outside the record and rule more 
favorably towards litigants who are more sympathetic or with 
whom they share demographic characteristics. On the whole, 
judges are excellent decision makers, and sometimes resist 
common errors of judgment that influence ordinary adults. The 
weight of the evidence, however, suggests that judges are 
vulnerable to systematic deviations from the ideal of judicial 
impartiality.300 
While some of these finding are summaries and complications of 
prior research, the outcomes suggest the prevalence of the issue is 
more widespread than ever believed. Also, analytics applied to 
large swaths of large scale data has led to the re-examination of 
prior smaller scale research. 
Consider one of the newest uses of data and algorithms: 
decisions relating to the granting of bail in the justice system. In 
the United States, the bail system, enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
is meant to ensure that all defendants have an opportunity to 
remain free until convicted of a crime.301 Concerns surrounding the 
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defendant’s willingness to return to court created a system in 
which defendant’s pay bail, which is cash that is retained by the 
court should the defendant not attend trial. While this system may 
read as a reasonable one, it is widely criticized as favoring those 
with money,302 as defendants without cash are unable to pay bail 
and thus languish, sometimes for extended periods of time in jail 
awaiting trial. In response to the bail dilemma, many States303 
have looked to data and advanced algorithms to gauge risk and 
hence, make bail recommendations.304 
As Jon Schuppe of NBC News notes: 
Modern algorithms promise to objectively weigh whether 
someone will behave a certain way. But they fall short in one 
key aspect: they can never reflect the mystery and uncertainty 
of everyday life.305 
Consider New Jersey’s Public Safety Assessment algorithm, which 
uses a variety of weighted factors to produce a number that 
purportedly reflect the individuals risk of skipping court and 
committing a new crime.306 The risk numbers appear in real time 
on the judge’s computer screen and is then used to make a bail 
determination. Should the attorneys disagree with the 
assessment, they challenge the outcome and a further hearing is 
set in which they “must persuade a judge to override the 
algorithm’s recommendation.”307 This process reflects a widely-
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held belief—as noted by NBC New Reporter Schuppe: “Algorithms 
need humans—flaws and all—to oversee them.”308 
Notably, the number of people being held before trial in New 
Jersey has dropped by nearly a third compared to last year.309 
Thus, commentators argue the system is working.310 
Unfortunately, the system also likely reflects a level of 
uncomfortableness. Simply put, the system allows for the 
overriding of the algorithm, which is the introduction of the prior 
bias that the algorithm was designed to eliminate, and it just 
reframes the reason given for the hearing.311 
As can be seen, the patterns revealed or verified lead to a level 
of uncomfortableness in many societal institutions, even those 
with the power to inflict dire consequences. The reaction society 
has to these pattern revelations will define us as a community for 
decades to come. 
Finally, discomfort must be considered in the context of the 
narratives that are crafted by the tech industry. There are many 
reasons to craft narratives that are simplistic, accessible and 
engaging, especially in the face of what can be a scary 
ununderstood world such as black box technology. Citizens are 
becoming worried about the Internet of Things (IoT) worried about 
their bank details being stolen, worried about weak passcodes, 
worried about where some of their “private” information is ending 
up. Narratives of the “flow” of information and creation of penalties 
and regulation make society feel safe, allow individuals to trust 
these systems, thereby encouraging continued use.  
Yet, many of these narratives are based in less than accurate 
understand on the systems, and are thus, nothing more than 
rubbish. While narratives to assist individuals in feeling safe 
online is likely socially beneficial, we must not allow policy to be 
based on rubbish narratives. Policy makers have to become 
comfortable with being uncomfortable and then seek to become 
more comfortable. More comfortable with the way systems work, 
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more comfortable with technology, more comfortable with the way 
that individuals interact with technology, more comfortable with 
the fact that many do not understand technology at all. If policy 
makers do not embrace being uncomfortable in all of its impacts, 
the policy they create will continue to be out of line with the 
realities of the cyber world. Failure to draft and implement 
multi-layered policy that accurately reflects the cyber world will 
cause lasting negative impacts well beyond the current generation. 
5. Embrace the Spectrum of Risk Analysis 
As was discussed above, the use of risk analysis, on both the 
large scale and local level, will allow the governance regime to 
focus on the true concerns and to attempt to mitigate those 
concerns in the most efficient manner. Adoption of the Risk 
Assessment creates a guiding set of standards to be considered in 
each setting and each level of regulation.  
6. Embrace Outcome Based-Impact Assessment 
Reject the overused term of “transparency” and insist upon 
policy that focuses upon the outcomes of the process, including 
audits or outcomes and impact assessment. Consider the recent 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau action in which two 
American Express banking subsidiaries were found to have 
discriminated against “consumers in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and other U.S. territories by providing them with credit 
and charge card terms that were inferior to those available in the 
fifty states.”312 In fact, some discrimination was predicated on the 
fact that some customers had Spanish-language preferences.313 In 
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this instance, the company discovered the unintentional 
discrimination when conducting an internal review of the various 
cards the company offered. The company “determined that certain 
cards issued in those markets through its international business 
did not uniformly have the same terms, conditions and features as 
the cards the company offered in the Continental United States.”314 
The company discovered the error by noticing unexpected 
discrepancies amongst the lending environments (the outcomes) 
and sought to compare discreet, identifiable, data points, amongst 
the various groups.315 The outcomes drew attention to underlying 
data revealing the source of the policy based discriminatory 
policies.  
Outcomes, when monitored and audited, can reveal a great 
deal about underlying issues, regardless of the transparency of the 
process that occurs. In this instance, as a discriminatory practice, 
the outcomes had a significant impact as well as “more than 
200,000 consumers were harmed” to the tune of “approximately 
$95 million.”316  
Impact assessments, that is the impact upon various 
stakeholders if the information is revealed (regardless of cause or 
source), is soon to be the only real means of considering harm as 
monetary loss will increasingly be difficult to demonstrate. The 
application of such considerations upon the use of data can be 
almost obvious when considered in light of some increasingly 
common activities of industry and states. For example, it is with 
increasing regularity that geolocation data is being used for a 
variety of purposes in our daily lives.317 Geolocation data is 
generally defined as would be “non-content information” which is 
often “generated or derived from, in whole or in part,” the operation 
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of a mobile device.318 The impact of the use of this data is the 
potential to “‘infer’ precise location of the (mobile) device.”319 In 
response to growing use of geolocation data that can infer location, 
Illinois General Assembly passed the Geolocation Privacy 
Protection Act seeking to limit the collection, use, retention, or 
disclosure of precise geolocation data from a mobile device without 
a person’s prior express and written consent.320 The argument, 
returning to various recommendations made within the paper, is 
that because the impact upon the data generator (or provider) can 
be significant, the legislative process needs to create regulation to 
prevent or reduce the impact. Although the Illinois law, the first of 
the kind in the nation, will likely result in new issues arising in 
the area of privacy and demand industry response, the process of 
consideration and response is most likely appropriate. 
Conclusion 
Data management and information governance are growing 
areas of ethical discussion. While much has been done in terms of 
data management, especially in the area of security, little has been 
done in terms of the regulation of transformative processes. This 
paper attempts to create a framework that could be used to identify 
global areas of concern, yet would be nimble enough to allow 
industry, and even individual businesses to consider policy 
creation. 
Key to the creation of policy is the rejection of common—often 
overstretched—legal concepts such as ‘privacy’ and property-based 
rights. Moreover, the use of consent and transparency—while 
appropriate in some situations—must be carefully considered in 
light of the proliferation of information available to individuals. 
Instead, policy makers and designers should begin to incorporate 
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a risk analysis that allows designers to consider risk of data loss 
or misuse and analyzes the issues through the potential harm it 
causes individuals. This framework allows individuals to be 
protected in the event of loss of harmful information, places 
responsibility on the individual to protect sensitive information 
and asks that other information be deemed as requiring less robust 
protections.  
Ultimately, more conversations about data, data loss, and data 
misuse must begin to take place, among all stakeholders, and these 
discussions must lead to the creation and use of a framework to 
assist designers in identifying information worthy of robust 
protection.  
